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BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE (AND SENATE): A PRESENTMENT 
REQUIREMENT FOR LEGISLATIVE SUBPOENAS UNDER THE ORDERS, 
RESOLUTIONS, AND VOTES CLAUSE 
 
Gary Lawson* 
Forthcoming, 83 Tex. L. Rev. – (2005)  
 
The potential payoff from challenging received wisdom is often uncertain.  
Received wisdom frequently has become received for very good reasons, and challenging 
it turns out to be a waste of time and energy for everyone concerned.  Sometimes the 
enterprise produces a modest positive payoff because the received wisdom emerges from 
the challenge stronger and better understood for the ordeal.  And on some relatively rare 
occasions, there is a large payoff when the received wisdom turns out to be far more 
received than wisdom, and long-established understandings must be rejected in favor of 
new learning. 
Seth Tillman might very well have hit the jackpot – or at least three cherries – 
with A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. 
Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Decided,1 in 
which he tries to shake up the received wisdom concerning the Constitution’s rules for 
the legislative process.  The Constitution’s widely neglected Order, Resolution and Vote 
Clause (“ORV Clause”)2 has long been understood by almost everyone, including myself, 
                                                 
*  Professor, Boston University School of Law. 
 
1
   83 Tex. L. Rev. – (2005) (forthcoming). 
 
2
   See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 3: 
 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of 
Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the 
President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or 
 2 
simply to prevent Congress from seeking to circumvent the Constitution’s presentment 
requirement by labelling a prospective law an “order,” “vote,” or “resolution” rather than 
a “bill.”  This superficially seems like a sensible constitutional precaution because bills 
are the only entities for which presentment to the President is textually required under 
Article I, Section 7, Clause 2.3  Mr. Tillman, however, argues that the ORV Clause 
additionally requires presentment for single-house action (other than adjournments, 
which are specifically exempted from the ORV Clause’s reach) taken pursuant to prior 
bicameral statutory authorization.  He would have us read the clause to include the 
following meaning (with his interpolations in brackets): 
Every [final] Order, Resolution, or Vote [of a single house] to which the 
[prior] Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary 
[as bicameral congressional authorization for subsequent single house action] 
(except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the 
United States [so that his veto might act upon the subsequent single house action 
just as it acted upon the prior authorizing legislation]; and before the Same 
[subsequent single house action] shall take Effect [in conformity with the prior 
authorizing legislation], shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, 
shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.4 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. 
 
3
   See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2: 
 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, 
before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall 
sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have 
originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If 
after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, 
together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if 
approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. If any Bill shall not be returned by 
the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the 
Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their 
Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law. 
 
4
   I have made some minor wordsmithing changes to Mr. Tillman’s interpolations, but the substance is 
unchanged. 
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Mr. Tillman is quite likely correct about the original meaning of the ORV Clause.  
It does not merely prevent Congress from circumventing the presentment requirement for 
bills through clever labelling, though it certainly does at least that much.  Instead, it also 
subjects to presentment a range of legislative action that is not subject to presentment 
under Article I, Section 7, Clause 2.  The ORV Clause is not merely an anti-
circumvention device; it also has independent substantive bite. 
One crucial element, however, is missing from Mr. Tillman’s discussion: he does 
not identify the class (or classes) of bicamerally-authorized single house actions to which 
the ORV Clause, as he interprets it, would apply.  That is, he has not identified the proper 
domain of the ORV Clause.  I propose to fill that gap here.  There is one – but quite 
possibly only one – important category of legally effective single-house action that 
requires prior legislative approval, and which therefore requires presentment to the 
President under the ORV Clause: the issuance (and perhaps also enforcement) of 
legislative subpoenas.  Neither House of Congress has the enumerated power to issue 
such subpoenas, but a law authorizing their issuance by individual Houses could well be 
“necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” powers validly granted to the 
respective Houses, such as impeachment powers.  The extension of presentment to those 
actions makes sense of the ORV Clause, and also makes sense as a matter of 
constitutional structure.  Although this is a narrower scope for the ORV Clause than Mr. 
Tillman envisions, I hope that he views this contribution as a friendly amendment, as 
once one identifies the legislative actions that are subject to presentment under the ORV 
Clause but not Article I, Section 7, Clause, 2, the construction of the ORV Clause 
advocated by Mr. Tillman gains in power and plausibility. 
 4 
 
I 
 
As Mr. Tillman details at length,5 James Madison’s minimalist understanding of 
the ORV Clause has acquired the exalted status of received wisdom.  After the 
Convention had drafted what is now Article I, Section 7, Clause 2, which concerns the 
process by which bills become laws through bicameral passage and presentment to the 
President, Madison worried that “if the negative of the President was confined to bills; it 
would be evaded by acts under the form and name of resolutions, votes, &c.”6  Madison 
accordingly “proposed that ‘or resolve’ should be added after ‘bill’ . . . with an exception 
as to votes of adjournment,”7 but that motion was defeated.  The next day, Edmund 
Randolph proposed the language that is now the ORV Clause, which was adopted.8  
Madison described Randoph’s successful motion as “having thrown into a new form the 
motion putting votes, resolutions, &c., on a footing with bills”9 – that is, as having the 
same purpose and effect as Madison’s defeated proposal from the prior day.  Madison’s 
account of the meaning of the ORV Clause as simply a clarification of the scope of the 
                                                 
5
   Tillman [56-63] 
 
6
   [Note to editors: As do most people these days, I get most of my sources on-line but prefer to cite the 
printed versions.  At the editing stage, I will insert appropriate citations to the printed works, but I don’t 
plan to track them down unless you are going to publish the piece.] 
 
7
   CITE 
 
8
   CITE 
 
9
   CITE 
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presentment requirement of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 has since been accepted by the 
Supreme Court10 and the scholarly community.11 
The Madisonian view limits the scope of the ORV Clause to preventing 
circumvention of the lawmaking processes of Article I, Section 7, Clause 2.  That 
precaution, of course, was completely unnecessary because of the principle of 
enumerated powers.  Under that principle, institutions of the federal government12 can 
only exercise those powers specifically granted to them and whatever incidental powers 
flow from those specific grants.  Congress’s power to make law accordingly comes from, 
and is defined by, those provisions of the Constitution that give Congress legislative 
jurisdiction over particular subjects and prescribe particular procedures for the exercise of 
that jurisdiction.  The procedural provision for lawmaking is Article I, Section 7, Clause 
2:  
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United 
States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his 
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the 
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such 
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be 
sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise 
be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a 
Law. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays 
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in 
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment 
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.13 
 
                                                 
10
   See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-47 (1983). 
 
11
   Tillman [59 n.88] 
 
12
   All federal powers are granted to specific institutions; the Constitution never vests powers in “the 
federal government” as an undifferentiated entity. 
 
13
   U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
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According to the clear terms of this provision, the only legislative entity that can ever 
become a law is a bill.  Nothing else – not a vote, not a resolution, not an order, not an 
Executive Order, not a regulation, not a judicial decision, not a singing telegram – can 
ever become a law under the Constitution, simply because there is no constitutional 
provision prescribing the process by which any of those other entities can become a law.  
If the ORV Clause merely reinforces this point, it is wholly redundant. 
That does not prove or mean that Madison was wrong about the effect of the ORV 
Clause.  Redundancy is a familiar feature of the Constitution.14  Many provisions 
function precisely as “anti-inference” provisions that do nothing more – and nothing less 
– than preempt arguments that might otherwise be made, even where those arguments 
would be clear losers without the anti-inference provision.15  But if the sole function of 
the ORV Clause was to emphasize that only bills can become laws, the clause’s language 
is very strangely suited to that task.  There are a lot of very easy ways to say that laws can 
only emerge from the process specified in Article I, Section 7, clause 2, and the odd 
locution of the ORV Clause does not leap to mind as the first choice.  That is not proof, 
in the strict logical sense, that the ORV Clause therefore serves an additional function, 
but it ought to make one suspicious. 
                                                 
14
   See Gary Lawson, Delegation As Discretion: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. – (2005) (forthcoming) (identifying a large number of obviously 
redundant constitutional provisions). 
 
15
   A good example is the Commander-in-Chief Clause of Article II, which states that “[t]he President shall 
be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, 
when called into the actual Service of the United States.”  U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  This clause does 
not grant the President the power to conduct military operations.  That power comes from the Article II 
Vesting Clause, which provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.” Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief Clause, however, 
Congress might be tempted to argue that its many enumerated powers over the military also include an 
implied power to direct troop movements.  The congressional argument would be a loser, but why not try to 
foreclose an entirely predictable confrontation between the legislative and executive departments? 
 
 7 
Mr. Tillman has followed those suspicions literally halfway around the world16 to 
the intriguing idea that the ORV Clause requires presentment for certain forms of single-
house actions that take effect pursuant to bicameral authorization.  The argument, which 
covers ground from pre-Founding English parliamentary practice to solid textual 
exegesis, is bold and (I think) ultimately successful in its broad mission, but it is missing 
a crucial element: What single-house actions could possibly be the referents of the ORV 
Clause?  What kind of single-house “Order, Resolution, or Vote,” subject to “necessary” 
(for what purpose?) bicameral concurrence, can ever “take Effect” (in what fashion?) 
subject to presentment? 
 Mr. Tillman is stingy with answers.  At no point in his article does he clearly 
define the domain of the ORV Clause as he interprets it.  The best that one can glean is 
that he envisions Congress, by legislation enacted pursuant to appropriate presentment 
and bicameral procedures, delegating authority to single houses, or perhaps even to single 
committees, in much the same way that it delegates to executive agents.  He suggests this 
possibility in passing when noting that the ORV Clause can reach beyond single-house 
action: “my tenative view is that Congress could delegate lawmaking authority (subject to 
a veto) to the committee of the whole or to any other committee or subcommittee . . . .”17  
He hints at it somewhat more clearly when discussing the British parliamentary roots of 
the ORV Clause: “The suggestion here is that statutory waiver of otherwise 
constitutionally mandated bicameralism was consistent with the British view of 
parliamentary sovereignty.  Parliament, as sovereign, could always delegate to any body: 
                                                 
16
   Tillman [71-77] 
 
17
   Tillman [84 n.127] 
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within or without itself.”18  He finally came clean in a letter to me: “I believe that 
anything that Congress might delegate to the President (or to the Executive Branch 
generally), Congress might alternatively or additionally delegate to a single-house with 
presentment . . . .”19 
This cannot define, even partially, the domain of the ORV Clause because it is a 
null set.  Congress cannot delegate lawmaking authority to anybody.  That is, of course, 
not the current view of any relevant governmental actor,20 but it is what the Constitution 
prescribes, which I take to be Mr. Tillman’s primary concern.  This is not the place to 
rehearse the arguments in favor of a constitutional nondelegation principle; I have done 
that at appalling length elsewhere.21  The central point for present purposes is that 
Congress is permitted to vest a measure of discretionary authority in executive and 
judicial agents because those agents are vested by the Constitution with, respectively, 
“[t]he executive Power”22 and “[t]he judicial Power.”23  Discretionary authority that is 
properly exercised by those actors is executive or judicial power that is exercised 
pursuant to legislation “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”24 federal 
powers.  It is not delegated legislative power.  The Consitution does not authorize the 
delegation of legislative power to the President, the courts, or anyone else.  The ORV 
                                                 
18
   Tillman [86] 
 
19
   Letter from Seth Barrett Tillman to Gary S. Lawson, Apr. 9, 2004, at 1. 
 
20
   See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev.  327, 329-30, 334 (2002). 
 
21
   See id.; Lawson, supra note XX. 
 
22
   U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 
23
   Id. art. III, § 1. 
 
24
   Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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Clause thus cannot require presentment for delegations of legislative authority to single 
houses or committees because the Constitution permits no such delegations. 
Nor can the ORV Clause refer to statutory authorizations for single houses to 
implement federal law.  The House or Senate, or committees of the House or Senate, are 
not vested by the Constitution with a general executive or judicial power.  They cannot 
duplicate the functions of executive or judicial agents. 
To illustrate this point, consider the actions at issue in the Supreme Court’s first 
case involving the nondelegation doctrine: Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States.25  
In 1811, Congress prescribed that a former 1809 statute imposing retaliatory restrictions 
on trade with England was again effective unless the President declared by proclamation 
that England had ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United States.26  The 
Court quickly brushed aside a delegation challenge to the President’s authority under this 
statute,27 explaining in a single sentence: “we can see no sufficient reason, why the 
legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of March 1st, 1809, either 
expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct.”28  I have explained at length 
elsewhere why, and when, such contingent legislation – that is, legislation that takes 
effect only upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of specified events – is 
                                                 
25
   11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813). 
 
26
   Id. at 384-85. 
 
27
   See id. at 385-86 (“Congress could not transfer the legislative power to the President.  To make the 
revival of a law depend upon the President’s proclamation, is to give to that proclamation the force of a 
law.”) (argument of  Joseph R. Ingersoll, counsel for appellant). 
 
28
   Id. at 388. 
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constitutionally permissible.29  One part of that analysis is critical to the present 
discussion: 
Every law has an effective date.  Laws can take effect immediately, on some 
specific future date, or on the happening of some future event that may or may not 
be certain to occur.  If a law takes effect only on the happening of some future 
event that is not certain to occur (or is not certain to occur at a specific time), it is 
contingent legislation. 
 . . . . 
 The Court [in the Brig Aurora] was corrrect to approve the general 
practice of contingent legislation.  Normally, a statute’s effective date will be a 
calendar date, but there is no evident reason why that effective date cannot be 
determined by some event other than celestial motions – such as legislation that 
takes effect only upon occurrence of natural disasters.  Once the statute identifies 
a contingent event as the trigger for effectiveness, someone must determine in any 
given case whether the event has occurred (just as someone must determine 
whether the relevant calendar date has occurred if the statute prescribes a calendar 
date).  That someone will either be an executive agent or a judicial agent: The 
interpretation of the contingency (What counts as a natural disaster? How high 
does the water have to rise before it constitutes a flood?) and the ascertainment of 
the whatever facts the contingency depends upon (How high did the water 
actually rise?) are core executive and judicial functions.30 
 
Thus, in The Brig Aurora, it was “necessary and proper” for Congress to allow the 
President to determine whether the specified contingency – England ceasing to violate the 
neutral commerce of the United States – had occurred, just as it would have been 
“necessary and proper” to allow the courts to make that determination if that had been 
Congress’s choice.  That is the sort of thing that executive and judicial actors, exercising 
executive and judicial powers, do for a living.  Congress could not, however, entrust that 
responsibility by statute to itself, one house, or a legislative committee.  Unlike the 
President and the courts, those legislative actors have no enumerated power to implement 
statutes.  It is not “necessary and proper” for Congress to attempt to authorize federal 
                                                 
29
   Lawson, supra note XX, at 363-69, 387-91. 
 
30
   Id. at 363-64. 
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actors who have no constitutionally-granted implementational authority to implement 
federal laws. 
The same considerations explain why the ORV Clause cannot refer to legislative 
vetoes.  A legislative veto is a device whereby executive action implementing a statute is 
voided by legislative action – whether by Congress, one house of Congress, or a 
congressional committee – which does not undergo presentment.  Legislative vetoes are 
thus a form of contingent legislation: action takes effect only upon the occurrence (or 
non-occurrence) of a stated contingency, in this case action (or non-action) by a 
congressional body.  But the specification of the effectiveness of action taken pursuant to 
statute is either a legislative task that must be accomplished through Article I, section 7, 
clause 2 legislation or an executive or judicial task in the implementation of a validly-
enacted statute.  Neither Congress nor any of its component parts has enumerated power 
to implement federal law in this fashion and thus cannot exercise a legislative veto.31  
If single houses of Congress cannot receive delegated legislative authority 
(because no one can receive delegated legislative authority) and cannot implement 
federal law such as contingent legislation (because congressional bodies have no 
enumerated implementational powers), then what legal actions potentially requiring 
                                                 
31
   The inquiry is muddled by the modern demise of the nondelegation doctrine.  If executive agents 
exercised only the kind of discretionary implementational power contemplated by the Constitution, it 
would (I think) be obvious that legislative vetoes are improper.  There would also be little or no motive to 
enact them.  Legislative vetoes exist because Congress grants executive actors a kind and quality of 
discretion that goes beyond executive power and therefore amounts to a delegation of legislative power.  It 
is understandable that the legislature would then want some say in how that legislative power gets 
exercised.  There is a non-frivolous case for the proposition that, given the existence of delegations of 
legislative power, a world with legislative vetoes is closer to the world envisioned by the real Constitution 
than is a world without them.  For an extraordinarily sophisticated presentation of this thesis, see Peter B. 
McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory 
of the Second Best, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1994).  For my brief (and, to most readers who do not share my 
peculiar interpretative bent, weak) rejoinder, see Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative 
State, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1252-53 (1994).  The short response is: The Constitution does not permit 
second-best solutions.  It means what it means. 
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presentment could single houses possibly engage in?  To what single-house actions could 
the ORV Clause refer even in principle? 
 
II 
 
The ORV Clause refers to “[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the 
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary . . . .”  
“Necessary” for what?  Obviously, necessary for such orders, resolutions, or votes to 
“take Effect.”  But we have already seen that no such orders, resolutions, or votes can 
ever take effect as laws, because only bills can become laws under the Constitution.  How 
can congressional action “take Effect” without becoming a law? 
Consider the constitutional powers of the individual Houses of Congress.  
Obviously, each House has enumerated powers pertaining to the lawmaking process 
under Article I, section 7.  Other than that, each House has the power (and duty) to 
choose its officers,32 to judge “the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own 
Members,”33 to adjourn,34 to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members 
for disorderly Behaviour, and . . . expel a Member,”35 and keep a journal of 
proceedings.36  The House has the power to impeach federal officers,37 while the Senate 
                                                 
32
   U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other 
Officers”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (“The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro 
tempore”). 
 
33
   Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 
34
   Id.; id. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. 
 
35
   Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 
36
   Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3. 
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has the power to try impeachments38 and to advise and consent to treaties and 
appointments.39  The concurrence of the other House is not required for the exercise of 
any of these powers.  Accordingly, the ORV Clause, with its specific reference to actions 
“to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be 
necessary,” is by its terms inapplicable to the direct exercise of any of these powers. 
Suppose that the House is considering whether to exercise its impeachment 
power.  In order to determine whether impeachment is warranted, the House quite 
naturally might want to hold hearings to gather information.  It might also want access to 
documents and/or witnesses that are not voluntarily produced.  Can the House issue a 
subpoena to compel production of the documents and/or testimony?  Can it enforce a 
subpoena that is issued and ignored? 
There is nothing in the Constitution that gives either House of Congress power to 
issue or enforce subpoenas.40  One could try to argue that such powers are necessarily 
implied in the powers granted to the individual Houses, but that is an argument that is 
very tough to make in the context of the federal Constitution, in which institutional 
powers are enumerated with considerable care.  Professor Michael Rappaport has ably 
tried to defend such an inference, but the case is unconvincing.  Professor Rappaport 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
37
   Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power of Impeachment”). 
 
38
   Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”). 
 
39
   Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 
40
  The issuance and enforcement of subpoenas are separate issues.  One could perfectly well believe that 
Congress has power to issue subpoenas but must secure the services of the executive to enforce them.  That 
refinement, however, is not directly pertinent to the scope of the ORV Clause.  The issuance of a subpoena 
– assuming that the issued document really is a subpoena rather than a polite request – is an event of legal 
significance regardless of who has ultimate enforcement power.  An order, vote, or resolution resulting in 
the issuance of a subpoena is thus an action that can “take Effect” within the meaning of the ORV Clause. 
 
 14 
argues that an inherent legislative authority to issue and enforce subpoenas finds support 
in both history and constitutional structure.  Historically, “Anglo-American legislatures, 
including the House of Commons, the colonial legislatures, many of the state houses 
prior to and after the ratification of the Constitution, and early Congresses had the power 
to punish contempts.  Moreover, in several of the state constitutions, this power was not 
conferred through an explicit provision.”41  And the power to enforce subpoenas, he 
argues, follows fairly naturally from a power to punish contempts.  But there are two 
basic problems with this argument.  First, examples from British, colonial, or state 
legislative practice are not especially probative of the powers of the federal Houses, 
because the federal legislature, unlike those other bodies, is an institution of limited and 
enumerated powers.  A general legislature might well have powers that a limited 
legislature does not.  The early understandings of both Congress and the Supreme Court 
with respect to legislative prerogatives under the American Constitution support 
Professor Rappaport’s position,42 but those historical understandings are at best weak 
evidence of original meaning.43  Congress can be expected to overstate its own powers, 
and the early Supreme Court was not distinguished by its fidelity to original meaning. 
                                                 
41
   Michael B. Rappaport, Replacing Independent Counsels with Congressional Investigations, 148 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1595, 1620 (2000). 
 
42
   See James M. Landis, Constitutional Limits on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 Harv. L. 
Rev. 153 (1926); C.S. Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 691 
(1926).  Both articles were prompted by the events ultimately giving rise to McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 
U.S. 135 (1927), which remains the leading Supreme Court decision supporting a congressional power of 
investigation. 
   
43
   On the critical difference between original understandings and original meanings, see Gary Lawson & 
Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion in American Legal History 9-12 
(2004); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret 
Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113 (2003).  Careful attention to this, incidentally, supports Mr. Tillman’s 
argument.  Mr. Tillman worries that he has found “no originalist materials directly supporting this 
position.”  Tillman [54]  If the search for original meaning was a search for direct evidence of mental states 
of concrete historical persons, this absence might be significant.  But if the search for original meaning is, 
 15 
This basic problem with deriving a congressional subpoena power from the 
Constitution can be seen in clearer focus by examining the remarks of James Landis, 
whose impressive historical study of the congressional investigatory power is one of the 
bulwarks of Professor Rappaport’s modern position.  Landis defended a broad 
congressional investigatory power, including the power to compel testimony, with the 
following observations: 
Legislative power unhappily fails to be either a word of art or a self-
defining concept.  Like judicial power, it summarizes the history of an institution 
of government for any particular period of time.  It did so in 1789.  When the 
political thinkers of that period erected a government and set forth its outlines in a 
constitution, they were not dealing with new concepts into which judges of a later 
date were to pour a meaning dissociated from past history and experience.  Bred 
to the bone, as they were, with English conceptions and traditions, a phrase such 
as legislative power, precipitated centuries of Parliamentary history and decades 
of colonial practice . . . .  Constitutions must be expounded.  Legislative power is 
no exception to such a general principle.44 
 
This is all well and fine, except for the small fact that the Constitution never vests 
“legislative power” in any federal institution.  The Constitution vests in Congress “[a]ll 
legislative Powers herein granted,”45 meaning that it vests in Congress that subset of all 
powers conceivably labelled “legislative” enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution.  
This is in stark contrast to the vesting clauses of Articles II and III, which vest in the 
President and the federal courts, respectively, a general “executive Power” and “judicial 
Power” – grants which do indeed include all powers fairly encompassed within those 
terms.  It is irrelevant what powers would belong to a body that is vested with a general 
                                                                                                                                                 
as I believe, a search for hypothetical mental states that would have been held by historical persons if they 
were in possession of all relevant information, the presence or absence of what Mr. Tillman calls 
“originalist materials” becomes far less significant. 
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   Landis, supra note XX, at 156. 
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   U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 1. 
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“legislative power” because Congress is not such a body.46  In the absence of an 
enumerated subpoena power, such a power can therefore only be located through a very 
strong and careful constructed inference. 
Professor Rappaport accordingly further invokes structure and purpose in support 
of an inference of a congressional subpoena power: “Without this power [to enforce 
subpoenas], the houses would have to rely on executive prosecutions for enforcement of 
their subpoenas.  This reliance, however, would render the impeachment and oversight 
powers far less effective because the executive branch might be reluctant to aid 
congressional investigations of itself.”47  This is all true, but is only relevant if one 
assumes that Congress must have power to compel testimony in order to carry out its 
tasks.  That is a huge assumption.  The Constitution specifically guarantees criminal 
defendants the right to compel testimony in their favor.48  There is no such specific 
guarantee for civil trials, nor is there any special provision for congressional 
investigations.  There is nothing logically absurd about an adjudicatory proceeding 
without compelled testimony.  Within a Constitution of limited and enumerated powers, 
it would require absurdity of a very high level in order to infer the existence of a power as 
potent as the power to issue and enforce subpoenas. 
This leads to the second problem with Professor Rappaport’s argument: one 
cannot draw a clear line from a legislative power to punish contempts in general to a 
power to enforce or issue subpoenas.  Perhaps one can make an “argument from 
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   It is an error that Landis repeated.  See Landis, supra note XX, at 221 (referring to “[t]he grant of 
legislative powers by the founders in 1789”). 
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   Rappaport, supra note XX, at 1620-21. 
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   U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
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absurdity” case for an unenumerated-but-implied power on the part of each House to 
punish attempts to disrupt its proceedings, as did the Supreme Court in 1821 in Anderson 
v. Dunn.49  There is an element of self-protection involved in such a power to preserve 
decorum and ability to function that is not present with respect to subpoenas.  The ability 
to issue subpoenas might make the job of the House and Senate easier, but the world 
would not fall in if no such power existed.  There is a much stronger case for inferring a 
power to punish contempts in limited circumstances involving potential disruption of 
congressional affairs than for inferring any such power with respect to subpoenas. 
I am frankly dubious about even the limited power recognized in Anderson v. 
Dunn.  It is not necessarily absurd to have the House and Senate depend on the President 
for criminal enforcement of their rules of decorum.  The President, after all, is completely 
dependent upon the House and Senate for funding50; the President cannot so much as buy 
pencils or paper clips without statutory authorization.  There are, of course, always grave 
dangers with making institutions dependent upon each other for important elements of 
their functions, but there are equally grave dangers with the opposite approach.  In any 
event, even if one could properly infer a congressional power to protect itself from 
disturbances, that does not support an inference of a congressional power to gather 
information through compulsion.  Arguments from necessity require necessity, and there 
is no necessity for subpoenas. 
Thus, the case for an inherent constitutional power on the part of Congress, or its 
constituent parts, to issue or enforce subpoenas is very weak.  There are, however, ways 
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   19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). 
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   See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9 cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law”). 
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in which each House can acquire the power to issue, and perhaps enforce, subpoenas 
without relying on remote inferences from granted powers.  Congress has power to enact 
legislation (subject to presentment) that is “necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  Can 
Congress constitutionally enact legislation authorizing each House to issue and enforce 
subpoenas, even if those bodies could not take such actions on their own? 
If the answer is “yes,” then the proper domain of the ORV Clause becomes clear.  
Suppose that such legislation authorizing the use of subpoenas by individual Houses in 
pursuance of their constitutional functions, such as impeachment, is permissible.  That 
authorizing legislation constitutes precisely the prior bicameral authorization for single-
house action that Mr. Tillman contemplates.  The issuance and/or enforcment of a 
subpoena by an individual House then becomes an “Order, Resolution, or Vote” that can 
“take Effect” – that is, have legal consequences other than as legislation.  The ORV 
Clause, so understood, requires that before any single House seeks to compel testimony 
pursuant to statutory authorization, that single-house action must be presented to the 
President just as was the authorizing legislation. 
This understanding of the ORV Clause makes a great deal of sense.  It is no small 
matter for Congress to subpoena executive materials or agents.  The presentment power is 
a sensible and natural way for presidents to protect executive prerogatives against 
legislative overreaching.  If Congress really wants the subpoena issued or enforced, it can 
override the President’s veto, so the ORV Clause does not totally block congressional 
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investigations.  But it does channel them through a presentment process, which is 
appropriate for congressional action that purports to have legal effect. 
There are a number of difficulties with this view of the congressional subpoena 
power and its relationship to the ORV Clause.  Most notably, it is not at all clear that the 
Sweeping Clause51 permits Congress to authorize single-house subpoenas.  The 
Sweeping Clause permits Congress to carry into effect the powers vested in the United 
States Government or its departments or officers.  The House and Senate are not the 
United States Government, federal departments, or federal officers.  The term 
“departments” refers either to the three great departments of the national government – 
the legislative, executive, and judicial departments – or to units of the executive 
department, such as the Treasury Department.  The individual houses of Congress are 
branches, not departments.52  Thus, a literal reading of the Sweeping Clause does not 
include the power to implement the various functions conferred on the individual Houses 
of Congress. 
There is some reason, however, to avoid this literal reading.  The Sweeping 
Clause speaks of powers “vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States.”  There are, strictly speaking, no such powers.  The Constitution does not ever 
grant powers to the “Government of the United States” as a unitary entity; all powers are 
granted to specific federal institutions, such as Congress, the House, the Senate, the 
President, the Vice-President, the Chief Justice, the federal courts, etc.  The best reading 
                                                 
51
   It has become conventional to refer to Article I, section 8, clause 18 as the “Necessary and Proper 
Clause.”  The founding generation, however, generally referred to it as the “Sweeping Clause.” 
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   See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural 
Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1156 n.6 (1992). 
 
 
 20 
of the Sweeping Clause is thus to treat the phrase “the Government of the United States” 
as meaning “principal institutions of the Government of the United States,” which would 
certainly include the constitutionally-created House and Senate.  On this understanding, 
Congress could, by statute, implement the various powers granted to the individual 
Houses. 
The second problem with this understanding of the subpoena power and ORV 
Clause is that the President’s presentment power with respect to subpoenas would extend 
not just to subpoenas aimed at the executive but at any legislatively-issued subpoenas 
regardless of their targets or scope.  Any such subpoena would result from an “Order, 
Resolution or Vote” taken pursuant to bicameral authorization and therefore would come 
within the terms of the ORV Clause.  But again, that is not an untoward result.  Houses of 
Congress have no enumerated subpoena powers, and there is nothing absurd about a 
world in which they have no such powers.  A fortiori, there is nothing absurd about a 
world in which they have such powers, but can only exercise them subject to 
presentment.  Which view, after all, is more consistent with a system of checks and 
balances? 
All of which leads up to the final question: Does the ORV Clause also apply to 
amendment resolutions under Article V?  The answer seems to be yes.  Article V states, 
in relevant part, that “[t]he Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments . . . .”53  The concurrence of both Houses is necessary for an amendment 
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resolution to have legal effect.  Accordingly, it fits within the plain terms of the ORV 
Clause.  The ORV Clause can extend to some forms of action in which the relevant 
“Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives” is prior authorization for 
subsequent action, but it also extends to action in which the “Concurrence of the Senate 
and House of Representatives” is immediately necessary to the very action at issue. 
 
III 
 
Thus, in the end, Mr. Tillman is right that the ORV Clause has a broader reach 
than has traditionally been thought.  It includes precisely the single-house action pursuant 
to prior bicameral legislative authorization for which he argues.  But the only action that 
falls within that description of which I am aware is the issuance and enforcement of 
subpoenas by single houses pursuant to authorizing legislation.  That is not necessarily 
the result that Mr. Tillman contemplated, but it is a result of considerable interest and 
significance.  
 
